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The Reach of the Constitution:
American Peace-time Court in West Berlin
C. M. A. McCauliff*
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court during the twentieth century has
developed several theories for analyzing the reach of the Constitution beyond
the borders of the United States. The first theory, which appeared in the In-
sular Cases' in the early part of the century, imposed geographical, territorial
limits on the reach of the Constitution. The issue in the Insular Cases was im-
perialism and the extension of the political power of the United States. The
Court evinced little concern for the question of protecting individuals from
government itself. By mid-century, territoriality had become irrelevant and
government had assumed much wider scope. The question of the reach of the
Constitution arose again in Reid v. Covert2 after the dependent of an American
serviceman was court-martialed abroad. The Court's decision in Reid pro-
pounded the second and third theories of the reach of the Constitution. The
Reid Court separately marshalled the concepts of due process and constitu-
tional rights to extend the reach of the Constitution. None of the opinions in
Reid directly addressed the issue of the propriety of particular governmental
acts. Instead, Reid invoked the Insular Cases in a situation that was inapposite
to the theory set forth in the Insular Cases. In subsequent years, neither the
due process nor the constitutional rights theory in Reid received universal ac-
ceptance; each led to a separate line of cases.
3
In addition, the Supreme Court indirectly considered the reach of the
Constitution during and after World War II in the context of the United
States' participation in international war tribunals and the exercise of United
States military jurisdiction in occupied lands.4 The Court avoided jurisdiction
in cases involving the international tribunals; it placed some reliance on con-
stitutional authority and due process in the occupation cases after World War
II. Although the challenge to the validity of the postwar occupations might
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. A.B., Bryn Mawr College,
1965; Ph.D., University of Toronto, 1969; J.D., University of Chicago, 1975. The author would like to
thank JohnJ. Eklund of the Class of 1980 at the Washington & Lee School of Law for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1 The Insular Cases, which deal with duty on merchandise from island territories, include, Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus
v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (vessel engaged in trade); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (oranges); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1 (1901) (sugar). See also nontariff Insular Cases: Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Philip-
pines) (grand jury or petit jury); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (Philippines); Rassmussen
v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (Alaska); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Philippines);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (Hawaii). Finally, see Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901)
which is not strictly an Insular Case since it involves a foreign country (Cuba).
2 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
3 See text accompanying notes 21-39 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 80-110 infra.
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have provided legal circumstances for analyzing the reach of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court emphasized that it could not directly review cases arising
under military jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court's analysis of the authority
of the occupation courts provided little guidance.
Only recently, an occupation court established by the authority of the
President as Commander-in-Chief provided a fourth theory of the reach of the
Constitution in United States v. Tiede.5 This new theory is based upon the duty of
a government official at home or abroad to act only in accordance with the
Constitution. It carries the due process and constitutional rights theories
beyond the analysis in Reid and applies them to the issues that the Supreme
Court did not address in the Insular Cases and Reid. This fourth theory permits
the Supreme Court to scrutinize officials' actions more closely in the future.
American participation in international tribunals and American occupation
courts and official action abroad under all circumstances would be subject to
review based on constitutional standards. The new theory of official action as a
measure of the reach of the Constitution can be fruitfully analyzed in the con-
text of the earlier Supreme Court theories of the reach of the Constitution.
II. The Insular Cases and Reid v. Covert
The American acquisition of territory from Spain by treaty6 following the
Spanish-American War of 1898 presented the first opportunity for the
Supreme Court to consider the reach of the Constitution. This seriously divid-
ed the Supreme Court in a long series of cases (the Insular Cases) 7 beginning
with the Court's 1900 term. It was not resolved with unanimity until more than
twenty years later in Balzac v. Porto Rico,8 when the Court ostensibly laid this
controversy over the territorial reach of the Constitution to rest by giving
recognition to the "incorporation" 9 theory as a constitutional doctrine.
The divisions among the Justices appeared in the first Insular Case, De
Lima v. Bidwell. 10 De Lima considered the validity of import duties on sugar
from "Porto Rico" after its cession to the United States by treaty in 1899. The
Attorney-General argued that Congress had "extended" the Constitution to
the territories by legislation and that the Constitution did not apply of its own
force to the territories. The Attorney-General concluded that Congress should
remain free to legislate for the territories without judicial review. The govern-
5 United States v. Tiede, - F.R.D. - (U.S.C.B. 1979), was decided by the United States Court for
Berlin which was established in 1955. The judge appointed to the court was United States District Judge
Herbert J. Stem of the District of New Jersey.
6 Treaty of Peace, December 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343. The treaty
is discussed in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
7 See note 1 supra.
8 Unanimity was reached in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Only Mr. Justice Holmes dif-
fered by concurring in the result without writing a separate concurrence.
9 "Incorporation," as the word was originally used regarding the Louisiana purchase in the passage
quoted by Mr. Justice White in Downes, 182 U.S. at 325, appeared only to promise ultimate statehood. All
the land contemplated by the term "incorporation" in 1803 was contiguous to the United States. "Incor-
poration" assured Louisana of future statehood. Mr. Justice White, however, took the word to mean an in-
termediate stage between acquisition and statehood. "Incorporated territory," might or might not become
a state and was not contiguous to the existing United States.
10 182 U.S. 1.
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ment's view was accepted only by Mr. Justice Gray," who thought that the
question was political rather than legal, thus requiring the courts to follow the
government's lead in the matter. The other Justices approached territoriality
as a constitutional question to be treated in accordance with their general at-
titudes toward the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Harlan's "simple, old-fashioned view of the Constitution"
1 2
was in essence that the Constitution
contained, in great measure at least, not merely relative wisdom based upon
the political experiences of English speaking peoples, but fundamental and ab-
solute principles of justice from which there could be no deviation if the
United States were to remain in the path traced by the founders.
13
Diametrically opposed to this fundamentalist view was Mr. Justice Brown's
''relative view" that the Constitution had "great but limited social value."14
Mr. Justice White struck a middle ground by proposing the vague, but flexible
"incorporation" theory which applied the Constitution in principle but not
necessarily in such specifics as right to trial by jury. Mr. Justice White set forth
the best-known statement of the theory of territorial "incorporation" in his
concurrence in Downes v. Bidwell. 15 "In the case of the territories, as in every
other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question
which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-
evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable." 1 6 The compromise
position of territorial incorporation recognized the political reality that the
strength of the United States did not extend to all governmental aspects of life
in its newly acquired territories. This first theory on the reach of the Constitu-
tion, proposed by Justice White, did not focus on the specifics of American of-
ficials performing duties in the territories. It thus left open for the future any
consideration of how the actions of American officials would be fitted into this
territorial theory.
Some fifty years later, the flexible approach of Mr. Justice White in
Downes was the subject of revived interest after it was approvingly cited by con-
curringJustices in the analysis of an entirely different issue by a divided court
in Reid v. Covert. 17 Reid gave rise to the second and third theories of the reach of
the Constitution and to two lines of cases, one based on the due process ap-
11 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 344 (Gray, J., concurring). Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of
Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 823, 826 (1926). See also Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L.
REv. 169 (1901).
12 Coudert, supra note 11, at 842.
13 Id. at 826.
14 Id.
15 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
16 Id. at 292. See Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587
(1949).
17 351 U.S. 470 (1956), rev'd on rehearing, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 50 U.S.C. 5 552 (11) (1951), held unconstitutional in Reid, is the successor provision to Ar-
ticle of War 2(d) enacted by Congress in 1916. See text accompanying notes 98-99 infra. After Reid, several
more cases came before the Supreme Court raising the issue of court-martial of civilians in the following cir-
cumstances: McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian employee, noncapital offense); Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian employee, capital offense); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) (civilian dependent, noncapital offense). In all, defendants were held entitled to trial by jury.
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proach of the second Mr. Justice Harlan, the other on constitutional rights,
espoused by Mr. Justice Black.
In Reid, Mrs. Covert, an American civilian on a military base in England,
was tried and convicted by court-martial for the murder of her Air Force
sergeant husband under a provision of the Articles of War enacted in 1916 and
carried over into the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Covert claimed her
court-martial violated the constitutional right to trial by jury. The issue in Reid
was military trial versus civilian trial by jury. The divisions among the Justices
over the applicability of the Insular Cases to American bases in foreign coun-
tries rather than to United States territories resulted in a very narrow holding
in Reid. The Court held unconstitutional so much of the provision of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice that permitted peace-time court-martial for
capital offenses by civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces
overseas. 18
The Insular Cases figured prominently injustice Harlan's concurrence in
Reid. Justice Harlan cited the flexibility of the Insular Cases as the hallmark in
dealing with any question of constitutional rights abroad, quite apart from con-
siderations of territorial incorporation. He reduced the question of which con-
stitutional safeguards apply in any given situation overseas to "the issue of
what process is 'due' a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular
case." 19 Mr. Justice Harlan's position was that each problem of action abroad
by the government should be treated as, in effect, a new Insular Case in which
the Court would decide whether the Constitutional provision relied upon is ap-
plicable.
Mr. Justice Black in the plurality opinion in Reid reacted against Mr.
Justice Harlan's use of the Insular Cases. The plurality cited the Insular Cases
only for the proposition that "constitutional limitations apply to the govern-
ment when it acts outside the continental United States.' '20 Thus, the ter-
ritorial reach of the Constitution and the areas outside the United States in
which the government acts were considered to be coextensive. Justice Black in-
terpreted the Insular Cases as imposing constitutional limitations on govern-
ment officials. This view, however, represented only dictum since a citizen was
claiming constitutional rights denied her by congressional enactment rather
than by the action of an American government official abroad.
Mr. Justice Black rejected the proposition read into the Insular Cases by
Mr. Justice Harlan "that only those constitutional rights which are 'fun-
damental' protect Americans abroad." Instead, he found "no warrant, in
logic or otherwise for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of
'Thou shalt nots' which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agen-
cies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.' '21
Reid did not present the issue of what restrictions the Constitution imposed on
governmental action abroad.
Due process and constitutional rights, as the concepts were used in Reid,
became the watchwords in later cases dealing with the reach of the Constitution
18 354 U.S. at 40-41.
19 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 8-9.
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in the context of extensive governmental action abroad. Direct application of
these concepts with little new analysis characterize the two post-Reid lines of
cases. These two lines of cases indicate the need for a cogent, unified analysis to
deal directly with the myriad problems arising from the expansion of govern-
mental activities abroad.
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of due process has been applied to unincor-
porated territory in two recent cases in the District of Columbia Circuit. In
King v. Morton,22 the court considered whether an American citizen charged
with a crime in violation of the laws of "the unincorporated territory of
American Samoa" was entitled under the Constitution to trial by jury. The
court interpreted the language of Mr. Justice White in 'Downes on the ap-
plicability of particular provisions of the Constitution to mean that the "con-
texts in which the cases were decided" were more important than the par-
ticular holdings of the Insular Cases. In this way, the principles of the Insular
Cases could be freely applied "to the situation as it exists in American Samoa
today," namely, to the facts of the "present legal and cultural development of
American Samoa."
On remand, the Court considered the feasibility of the Samoan people
fulfilling the requirements necessary to make the jury system operable.
23 It
heard testimony and received briefs on whether the Samoan people could be
objective in convicting members of their own kinship group and whether the
Samoan class culture would accommodate trial before one's peers. In addition,
the Court considered the practicality of instituting the jury system, given the
geography of the islands, the available population pool and the extent of
democratic participation in government by the Samoan people. In light of these
factors, the court held that King was entitled to a trial by jury in American
Samoa. This use of the due process theory of Reid required detailed factual
studies but no refinement of the due process theory of the reach of the Constitu-
tion appeared in King.
In a somewhat more theoretical application of the approach set forth by
Mr. Harlan in Reid, due process was held in Ralpho v. Bell24 to apply to ad-
ministrative tribunals established under article IV of the Constitution, which
empowers Congress to make rules and regulations for the territories. In the
unincorporated trusteeship of Micronesia, the United States Claims Commis-
sion, an administrative tribunal, withheld its schedule on the valuation of prop-
erty from Ralpho. Without access to the schedule and its basis, Ralpho could
not rebut the applicability of the schedule to his claim for the destruction of his
property.
After holding that the fifth amendment "binds the commission and
Ralpho is entitled to demand its protections," 25 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit stated: "[I]t is settled that 'there cannot exist under the American flag any
governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due process of
22 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
23 King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1977) (on remand).
24 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25 Id. at 618. Under Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. at 309, the status (as American citizens or not) of
the people in the territories does not affect the applicability of the Constitution,
[June 1980)
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law .... ",26 This statement constitutes the only post-Reid expansion of the due
process theory of the reach of the Constitution. Unlike the detailed factual ap-
plication of the due process theory to American Samoa in King v. Morton, the
Ralpho court treated due process as a principle of law. By focusing attention on
governmental authority and applying constitutional standards to that authori-
ty, Ralpho contributes a new principle to the due process theory of the reach of
the Constitution. The Ralpho court directly confronted the issue of protection
from governmental authority itself which was only implicitly treated in Reid.
On petition for rehearing, 27 the commission claimed that only constitu-
tional violations which impair "extremely significant" personal interests are
judicially reviewable.28 The Ralpho court held that no constitutional claim
could be placed "beyond the pale of judicial review" and that constitutional
claims would be protected even when the constitutional interests were not ex-
tremely significant personal interests. As a corollary to the direct confrontation
of the issue of protection from governmental authority, the Ralpho court, con-
sidering the petition.for rehearing, rejected the government's contention that
the issue was political rather than legal and, therefore, beyond judicial review.
Ralpho stands for heightened protection of individual interests by emphasizing
(1) the obligations owed by governmental authority to those affected by govern-
mental actions, and (2) the role of the courts in reviewing arbitrary governmen-
tal action violative of constitutional rights. Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Reid gave the Insular Cases renewed vitality29 by focusing on due process. King
and Ralpho extended stricter scrutiny under the Constitution to the actions of
the United States in unincorporated territories and abroad than had appeared
possible when the Insular Cases first arose. These cases applied the second
theory of the reach of the Constitution, the due process approach developed in
the concurrence in Reid.
During the early 1960's, a line of cases based on the plurality opinion in
Reid guaranteed the constitutional right to trial by jury in the then-American-
occupied Ryukyu Islands. The United States occupied the Japanese-owned
Ryukyus (of which Okinawa is the largest island) in the course of the offensive
against Japan during World War II. Since the Ryukyus provided a strategic
military base for the protection of American interest in Asia, the United States
continued to occupy the Ryukyus for twenty years after signing the peace trea-
ty withJapan in 1952. The American authorities established a civil administra-
tion court in the Ryukyus but did not provide for trial by jury. After Reid,
several defendants who were tried in the Ryukyus without ajury sought habeas
corpus relief in the federal district court in the District of Columbia. The
district court never directly addressed the denial of constitutional rights by
governmental action, but simply applied the third theory of the reach of the
Constitution.
In Ikeda v. McNamara, 30 the defendant was charged in the United States
26 569 F.2d at 618-19 (footnote omitted).
27 Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28 Id. at 637.
29 Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469 (1979), follows the Insular Cases in holding that the fourth
amendment applies to Puerto Rico.
30 No. 416-62 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1962).
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Civil Administration Court of the Ryukyu Islands with fraud under Article 46
of the Penal Code of Japan for operating without a foreign investment license
from the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands. While confined for trial by the
civil administration court, he sought habeas corpus relief in the District of Co-
lumbia District Court; Ikeda claimed that the denial of a trial by jury violated
his constitutional rights. The court concluded that Ikeda's constitutional rights
under article III, section 2, clause 3 had been violated by the denial of a trial by
jury. The judges in the Ryukyuan civil administration court were not federal
judges appointed under article III of the Constitution. The court, however,
refused to hold that a trial before a court established by Congress in accordance
with article III, section 1 of the Constitution was necessary. 3' No change in the
nature of the Ryukyuan occupation court itself was required to guarantee peti-
tioner's constitutional rights. The civil administration court did not need to
have article III judges appointed to it. To satisfy the Constitution, only trial by
jury had to be implemented.
In Nicholson v. McNamara,3 2 both parties assumed that the nature of the
Ryukyuan court as an occupation court would be the decisive factor in whether
petitioner was entitled to a trial by jury. 33 Mrs. Nicholson was confined pur-
suant to an information charging her with murder. No grand jury indicted her
and she was tried by the civil administration court without a jury. The parties
assumed that if the civil administration court were an occupation court, no trial
by jury could be provided. The District of Columbia District Court, however,
did not attempt to interpret the status of the occupation. Instead, the court held
simply that the lack of indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury violated
her rights under article III, section 2, clause 3 and the fifth and sixth amend-
ments to the Constitution.
3 4
The petitions by Ikeda and Nicholson prompted McNamara to take action
extending constitutional rights to all persons appearing before the Ryukyuan
civil administration court. The Secretary of Defense, on March 8, 1963, pro-
posed occupation legislation through the Ryukyuan civil administration to
comply with Reid.3 5 The legislation provided for indictment by grand jury and
trial by petit jury. Ryukyuans were made eligible for jury service, but the local
legislation could, of course, not change the nature of the occupation courts by
reconstituting them under article III, section 1 of the Constitution. Reid re-
quired only indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury, as Ikeda and
Nicholson made clear. By directly applying constitutional requirements to the
form of trial allowed in the Ryukyus, the District of Columbia District Court
followed Mr. justice Black's constitutional rights approach to the reach of the
Constitution.
31 The court specifically struck out four references to petitioner's request for a trial before a court
established by Congress in accordance with article III, section 1 of the Constitution.
32 No. 141-61 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1963).
33 Secretary of Defense's Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 11-12, 25-26, Nicholson v. McNamara, No. 141-61 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1963); Petitioner's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 15, 30, Nicholson v. McNamara, No. 141-61 (D.D.C. Nov. 15,
1963).
34 Nicholson v. McNamara, No. 141-61, at 4.
35 George, The United States in the Ryukyus: The Insular Cases Reinstated, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 793, 794
n.54 (1964).
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Thereafter, in Rose v. McNamara, 3 6 Eiko Uehara Rose, who was convicted
in Okinawa after a trial by jury of evading local income taxes, argued that
under Reid her rights to a trial in a court established by Congress were violated
because "civil administration courts have no such derivation, but are, rather,
an arm of the Executive." 37 In holding Mrs. Covert had a right to a trial by
jury, Mr. Justice Black had stated only that constitutional limitations apply to
the government when it acts outside the continental United States. The District
of Columbia Circuit agreed with Rose's- contention that the occupation court
was not established under article III of the Constitution, but found that the
result she sought was not compelled:
In so maintaining, she misinterprets the Reid decision. While Mr. Justice
Black held in Reid that Article III, Section Two, providing for a jury trial at the
location of a crime, is a vital constitutional protection which the United States
cannot ignore when acting against its citizens abroad, nowhere did he accord
the same status to Article III, Section One, which gives to Congress the power to
establish courts and judicial positions.
38
The District of Columbia -Circuit held that the President's authority to
establish and maintain occupation courts in the Ryukyus survived the peace
treaty, 39 that the courts were not established under article II and that no viola-
tion of constitutional rights occurs when criminal defendants in the United
States are tried by jury before non-article III judges.
Thus, on the strength of Mr. Justice Black's dictum in Reid, constitutional
guarantees of indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury were gradually
extended to American citizen and noncitizen alike by case law and by occupa-
tion legislation in the Ryukyu Islands. These post-Reid developments ex-
emplify the direct application of the constitutional rights theory without ad-
vancement in the theory itself. The issue of protection from government by re-
quiring government to comply with the Constitution was not addressed in these
cases.
The first theory of the reach of the Constitution, which emerged from the
Insular Cases, emphasized that the Constitution is always operative in princi-
ple but its particular applicability is limited by territorial constraints. The con-
currence in Reid interpreted the Insular Cases to require due process abroad.
According to the plurality opinion in Reid, the Insular Cases stand for the prop-
osition that constitutional limitations apply to the government when it acts out-
side the continental United States. Neither Reid nor its due process and con-
stitutional rights progeny dealt fully with the modern ramifications of govern-
mental action abroad. The concurrence and plurality opinions in Reid enabled
subsequent case law to extend the applicability of particular constitutional pro-
visions in unusual circumstances. Nevertheless, subsequent courts have failed
to propose an analysis for limiting governmental action abroad in accordance
with constitutional principles. Only Ralpho v. Bell hinted at wider application of
36 375 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
37 Id. at 927.
38 Id. at 927 n.5.
39 Id. at 929.
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the due process theory of the reach of the Constitution to impose constitutional
limitations on governmental action abroad. Constitutional limitations on
governmental action abroad were not central to the three Supreme Court
theories of the reach of the Constitution.
III. United States v. Tiede
Against the background of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the
reach of the Constitution, an American court sitting in West Berlin recently
provided a fourth theory for analyzing the question. In status, the American
court in Berlin is similar to the Ryukyuan occupation court. The present
American expression of sovereignty in West Berlin stems from its wartime oc-
cupation of Germany, but continues only because of the inability of the Allies
(the United States, Great Britain, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics) to reach agreement on the reunification of Germany.40 In 1955, the
American occupation courts in Germany were dissolved.4 1 The jurisdiction
survived only in Berlin as the United States Court for Berlin.
42
On August 30, 1978, two East Germans, Tiede and Ruske, entered the
American zone of Berlin at Tempelhof Central Airport by diverting to West
Berlin scheduled Polish Lot Airlines flight 165, which was originally en route
from Gdansk, Poland, to Schoenefeld Airport in East Germany.43 On the basis
40 When the occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany itself ended in 1955, the principles govern-
ing relations between occupied Berlin and the occupying powers were restated by the United States, Great
Britain and France, which retained their rights in Berlin vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Convention on Rela-
tions between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4251,
T.I.A.S. No. 3425.
41 See In re Kraussman, 130 F. Supp. 926 (D. Conn. 1955). There the court held that although the United
States High Commission (USHC) courts continued in existence to dispose of matters arising during the oc-
cupation, the USHC's request for extradition could not be granted. Because the extradition statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3185 (1976), required full exercise of governmental authority by the party requesting extradition,
the court held that the USHC is not the "chief executive officer in control." Thus the position of the United
States in Germany and Berlin did not amount to the level of occupation required for extradition. 130 F.
Supp. at 928. The court interpreted the United States' retention of powers in 1955 to be "principally for the
purpose of dealing with the Soviet Republics relative to the reunification of Germany and a peace treaty....
The Government has offered no proof that the situation in the American sector of Berlin is factually different
from this." Id. at 929.
42 The United States Court for Berlin was established by USHC Law No. 46, April 28, 1955. The text
of Law 46 appears as an Appendix to the opinion in United States v. Tiede, - F.R.D. - (U.S.C.B. 1979).
43 At about 9:45 a.m. on August 30, when Flight 165 was a few minutes from landing, passenger Hanes
Detlev Alexander Tiede asked fellow passenger Ingrid Ruske to hand him her daughter Sabine's coat. In the
girl's coat pocket was a "toy" teargas pistol. Tiede took the gun, went to the front of the plane and grabbed
a stewardess by the hair. He put the gun to her head and forced her to the floor. Tiede told the stewards that
he knew what Schoenefeld looked like and that if the plane did not land at Tempelhof, he would shoot the
stewardess.
The pilot radioed that a hijacking was in progress and landed at Tempelhof. The American officer in
charge of logistics at Tempelhof, Lt. Col. Brymer, talked to the copilot. With the assurance that all on board
were safe, Brymer had the pilot shut down the engines. Tiede came to the side door of the plane, gun in
hand. Brymer smiled, said "Welcome to free West Berlin" and asked Tiede to throw down the gun. Tiede
smiled and did so. Tiede asked for the police and then called out "Does anybody else want to get off here?"
Ingrid and Sabine Ruske and approximately eight other persons deplaned. The police came. Tiede, who ap-
plied a dozen times to leave East Germany, and the Ruskes were taken into custody by American officials.
Transcript of record, at 23 ff. [hereinafter cited as Record].
The records of the court are kept in the United States Mission, Berlin, where they are, of course, public
documents. Another copy of the records is available at the University of Chicago Law School. This descrip-
tion is based primarily on the testimony of Lt. Col. Goeller, commander of the United States Air Force Of-
fice of Special Investigation, at the preliminary hearing on probable cause for arrest. The Polish customs in-
spector, whose responsibility it is to check for smuggling, testified at a deposition read into the record at trial
that Sabine Ruske's gun looked like a toy she had been shown a few days previously. Record, at 2076, 2083.
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of the residual American jurisdiction over aviation in Berlin, the United States
became responsible for trying the defendants. Accordingly, the United States
Court for Berlin (the court) was convened for the first time in its twenty-four
years of existence. The defendants were charged on information 44 and
demanded a trial by jury.
A. Does the Constitution Apply?
The defendants' demand for a jury trial required that the court initially
determine whether the Constitution applied at all. The government took the
position that the reach of the Constitution is a political, rather than legal, ques-
tion in the context of litigation in occupied territory. In the classic tradition of
the State Department, the government urged that since the American position
in Berlin was a matter of foreign affairs, the State Department had controlling
authority to deal with any events concerning United States' interests in Berlin.
The government contended that
[A] defendant tried in the United States Court for Berlin is afforded cer-
tain rights found in the Constitution, but he receives these rights not by force
of the Constitution itself (because the full range of substantive and procedural
Constitutional safeguards applicable to a trial of a criminal case in a federal
District Court in the United States does not apply in an occupation court such
as this), but because the Secretary of State has made the determination that
these certain rights should be provided.
4 5
There has been no judicial holding that the United States, in the course of
exercising judicial powers in the occupation of Germany, must comport with
all of the Constitutional restrictions applicable to the United States dealings at
home. It is apparent from the few relevant cases that the conduct of occupation
is a suigeneris exercise of Constitutional authority, and one in which the full ap-
plication of all Constitutional limitations cannot be presumed.
The continuation of an occupation, and the degree to which occupation
authority should be directly exercised are matters which involve delicate
political questions .... 46
The State Department treated criminal trials in a court established by the
authority of the United States High Commissioner for Germany as political
rather than judicial matters. If the State Department's position were correct, it
would have the discretion to decide what "rights," if any, to accord the defen-
44 The information against Tiede, filed January 15, 1979, charged Tiede under the following five
counts: 1) assault on air traffic in violation of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) § 316(c); 2) tak-
ing of hostages (in violation of S 239(b); 3) deprivation of liberty in violation of § 239; 4) assault in violation
of § 233; 5) unlicensed carriage of firearms (a Brevettht Mondial Model 1900 .22 caliber teargas and blank
pistol) in violation of § 14 and 26 of the Weapons Law (Waffengesetz) of March 18, 1938, as amended
November 26, 1974, The Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany applies in Berlin. The
Weapons Law is still in force but only in Berlin as state law.
The information against Ingrid Ruske, filedJanuary 15, 1979, has three separate counts charging Mrs.
Ruske of acting jointly (§ 25 (2) of the Criminal Code (principals and participation)) with Tiede to divert the
aircraft in violation of §§ 316(c), 239. The delay between August 30, 1978 and January 15, 1979 is ac-
counted in large part by the political decision of the German and American governments concerning which
jurisdiction would try Tiede and Ruske. During that time, Tiede was held at Moabit Detention Center in
Berlin. Mrs. Ruske was also held in custody for part of that time.
45 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Regarding the Application of the Constitution
of the United States to These Proceedings at 2 United States v. Tiede, Mar. 7, 1979 [hereinafter cited as
Government's Memorandum].
46 Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
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dants. In effect, the State Department was asking the court to espouse the posi-
tion taken by Mr. Justice Gray in the Insular Cases.
47
The State Department contended that the Constitution extended in Berlin
only to authorize a military occupation by the executive under article II and
that it did not govern the activities of the executive in conducting that occupa-
tion. On the basis of the absence of trial by jury in certain situations, the
government argued, in effect, that the Constitution gave the executive carte
blanche in the conduct of an occupation. The cases cited in support of the
government's argument, which permitted deviation from the standard civilian
trial by jury, were, however, not decided on the grounds that the Constitution
was inapplicable. 48 Instead, the cases on executive authority cited by the
government limited approval of governmental procedures only to constitu-
tional exercises of authority by the executive. Prior decisions had sanctioned
deviations from trial by jury when defendants allegedly violated the law of war,
and when statute extended the scope of the constitutional exception from trial
by jury for military jurisdiction. No claims for unlimited executive authority
had been judicially sanctioned.
The breadth of the government's argument for executive discretion
highlighted the need to protect persons from arbitrary exercises of the govern-
mental authority. The court characterized the total discretion sought by the
government as perhaps appropriate in dire emergencies, requiring the imposi-
tion of martial law under the Constitution, but inappropriate to other types of
military jurisdiction such as an occupation. 49 The court refused to consider the
question of the applicability of the Constitution in an occupied area as a
political question. In doing so, the court relied on what it considered a subtle
distinction: "the applicability of any provision of the Constitution is itself a
point of constitutional law, to be decided in the last instance by the judiciary,
not by the Executive Branch." ' 50 From this point of logic, the court held that
whether the Constitution applies was properly a legal question.
The court's decision, that the question of the reach of the Constitution was
a legal rather than a political question, comports with constitutional decisions
extending back into the nineteenth century.5 1 Mr. Justice Gray was alone
when he took the position in De Lima v. Bidwell that territoriality was a political
question. Since the time of the Insular Cases, the traditional reliance of the
government on the political question doctrine has been seriously discredited.
The effects of the doctrine of separation of powers on the relationship between
the State Department and the courts have been analyzed in scholarly articles,
52
47 See text accompanying note 11 supra. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 344 (1901) (Gray, J.,
concurring).
48 Madsen v. Kinsella 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See text accompanying
notes 86-92, 97-104.
49 Record, vol. 2, at 194.
50 Slip Opinion at 51.
51 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
52 P. JFssup, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); Bilder, The Office of the LegalAdvisers: The State
Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962); Cardozo,Judicial Deference to State Depart-
ment Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963); Moore, The
Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1972); Note, The Relationship be-
tween Executive andjudiciay: The State Department as the Supreme Court of International Law, 53 MINN. L. REv. 389
(1968).
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which suggest various methods for determining a line of demarcation between
the political province of the State Department and judicial decisions of the
courts. The following method for determining that line- is suggested by a com-
mentator 3 who endorses "the guiding principle of executive dominance in the
conduct of foreign affairs":54
it is right that legal notions of the political branches of government should be
respected by the courts. On the other hand, there is no reason for the courts to
abdicate their function in deference to this principle in those cases in which
there is at stake no matter of international law substantially affecting the na-
tional interest. Particularly, the courts should restrict the tendency of the ex-
ecutive to take over, in proceedings which lack procedural safeguards, the
determination of an entire case merely because the case happens to have an in-
ternational law element.
Finally, it is for the courts to decide whether or not to accept "sugges-
tions," and to determine what effect to give these "suggestions." The courts
should accede to such "suggestions" only where a sufficient reason-the
safeguarding of the national interest by preservation of the United States'
posture in international law-has been convincingly shown.
55
On the one hand, according to this method, a judicial determination of
whether an occupation is in progress could have international repercussions; in
that case judicial determination is better avoided.5 6 On the other hand,
recognition that Germany and the United States are not enemies57 is not only
judicially proper, but any other judicial stance would contravene Congress and
the proper executive control of foreign policy. A balancing test for identifying a
political question in the area of foreign affairs has emerged: the need for the
United States to present a unified position on sensitive issues of international
law affecting our national interest must be weighed against the need to resolve
disputes in accordance with the fundamental notions of fairness embodied in
the Constitution. Under this test, the question of the reach of the Constitution
is not a political question.
In deciding whether the Constitution applied in proceedings before it, the
United States Court for Berlin stated the following propositions at the outset of
its oral opinion delivered on March 14, 1979:
For if the executive branch is not willing to accept the confines of the
Constitution in all things, they may throw it off in all things.
5 8
[I]t is a first principle of American life, [njot only life at home but life
abroad, that everything its public officials do is governed by, measured
53 Franck, The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion forJudicial Abdication, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 1101 (1960).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1123.
56 "[Iln international law the admission that the former protagonists are at peace, even in the absence
of a peace treaty, may make the occupying troops subject to the criminal and other laws of the defeated
state." Id. at 1122. See also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). In Madsen, the Court stated that an
occupation may survive a treaty of peace, citing numerous cases and W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS, at 801 (2d rev. ed. 1920). 343 U.S. at 360.
57 "[I]t would have been permissible for a court to find that the United States was no longer at war with
Germany even prior to the joint resolution of Congress of October 19, 1951, which terminated the state of
war with Germany." Franck, supra note 53, at 1119. See also ScharpfJudidal Review and the Political Question:
A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517, 572, 584 (1966).
58 Record, vol. 2, at 184.
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against, and authorized by the United States Constitution. And, if the
authority for it is not found there, there is no authority for it at all.
That is not to say that the Constitution requires the same thing no matter
what the circumstances or what the condition is. It is a living document.
59
The court cited Ex parte Milligan, in which the Supreme Court held that the
"Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,
at all times, and under all circumstances." 60
With the thought that the Constitution "was designed and made to be ap-
plied in changing circumstances, in changing conditions," 61 the court
distinguished the Insular Cases and Reid v. Covert from the present American
position in Germany. The occupation of Germany was an assertion by military
conquest of American sovereignty. American officials acting in Berlin pursuant
to that sovereignty established an occupation court in 1955 with jurisdiction
over Americans, Germans and, indeed, anyone in the American Sector of
Berlin. The court emphasized that the position of the American official as one
who has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution was the central factor in
deciding whether the Constitution applied in the United States Court for Berlin
in 1979. The oath taken by a government official such as the Secretary of State
compelled the application of the Constitution.
This fourth theory of the reach of the Constitution focuses on the govern-
ment official as the measure for the applicability of the Constitution. The of-
ficial action theory expands the scope of the fundamental rights theory set forth
in the plurality opinion in Reid by providing explicit protection against govern-
mental violation of its own Constitution abroad. Mr. Justice Black's dictum in
Reid that constitutional limitations apply to the government when it acts out-
side the continental United States is centrally important in Tiede in light of the
government's claim to unlimited discretion in granting constitutional "rights"
abroad. This theory of the reach of the Constitution removes the emphasis
from the citizen claiming protection and places primary emphasis on the duty
of the government to observe constitutional safeguards and limitations
wherever it acts. The constitutional rights of the citizen in Reid are sup-
plemented in Tiede by the corresponding governmental duty to act under the
Constitution, no matter upon whom the impact of its action falls.
The criterion of the exercise of constitutional office obviates the necessity
of a strong territorial connection virtually amounting to statehood as a prereq-
uisite to the extension of all constitutional protections. It permits the United
States to give equal treatment to all persons coming in contact with the
sovereign power of the United States government, citizen and noncitizen alike.
It vests American officials with the outward sign that they "may not do
anything that violates the Constitution of the United States' '62 and holds them
always and everywhere to the same high standards which the Constitution re-
59 Id. at 185.
60 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21.
61 Record, vol. 2, at 185.
62 Id. at 190.
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quires of officials at home: "when the United States acts through its agents
abroad it acts under the Constitution or not at all. "63
On its face the court's holding that the Constitution applies in the United
States Court for Berlin appears startlingly simple, right and in accord with all
we have known and everything we have come to expect of constitutional
safeguards and protections. Indeed, the court's decision accords even with the
"method" outlined forjudicial and executive interaction with regard to "sug-
gestions": the government's memorandum did not show that any national in-
terest would be harmed by the court's decision.
64
The decision must be seen as courageous, however, for it raises again the
fundamental questions at issue during the debates on the adoption of the Con-
stitution itself, during the Civil War, over the issue of imperialism and the In-
sular Cases and, indeed, at all times of great constitutional crisis or upheaval.
This is true even though Reid, Rose, King and Ralpho have provided precedents
far advanced from the posture of the Insular Cases. The issue of whether the
Constitution applies, each time it is raised anew, is an issue which naturally
engenders controversy. The question is not likely to be treated as a matter of
indifference by anyone. Our individual answers to the question of vhether the
Constitution applies in a new situation involve everything we believe about the
nature of law and freedom. Do we wish to keep constitutional safeguards only
for ourselves or do we see them as the embodiment of fundamental rights which
cannot be denied to anyone over whom the sovereignty of the United States
government is exercised? No matter how we answer the question, our in-
dividual answers are based on our sense of our own integrity and our most
deeply held beliefs.
B. Are Defendants Entitled to a Jury?
The official action theory focuses on the duty of officials sworn to uphold
the Constitution. The undisputed sovereign presence of the United States in
West Berlin permitted this theory to be constructed in a political situation
almost entirely opposite from that of the Insular Cases. In Berlin, the State
Department argued that its jurisdiction obviated the application of Constitu-
tional principles. In the Insular Cases, the sovereign power of the United
States was itself unclear. The official action theory, rather than analyzing the
concept of extending American political power over a new territory, addresses
the obligations the Constitution imposes on American officials wherever they
act.
Although the Constitution is directly applicable in the United States Court
for Berlin because of the official American presence in Berlin, that presence
and the official's duty to act in accord with constitutional limitations do not
automatically require a trial by jury in every situation, just as a trial by.jury is
not invariably required in the United States. The court approached the issue of
trial by jury separately:
63 Id.
64 See text accompanying notes 53-55 sup ra.
[Vol. 55:682)
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The issue remains: in this court, in this place, at this time, under these
circumstances, are these defendants charged with these crimes entitled to a
trial by jury? And that is not an easy question to resolve. Only the most dis-
ingenuous would suggest that the law in this area has not been changing.
Clearly, in 1890 we wouldn't have even asked the question. In 1901 we would
have asked a different question. In 1944, we would have asked a third ques-
tion. In 1957 perhaps a different one. Today it is asked again. 65
The court analyzed "the nature of the crime charged, the legal status of
the accused, and the circumstances of the occupation." 66 The "nature of the
crime charged" in Tiede meant conduct that neither violated the law of war nor
constituted an attack on the United States government. The accused were
neither military personnel nor in belligerent status with the United States.
They were simply foreign civilians from the German Democratic Republic, a
country at peace with the United States. The purpose of the occupation of West
Berlin, though military in origin, was, according to the German government
itself, only "to ensure the city's freedom and viability. Occupation Powers had
become Protection Powers."
67
Case law provides two basic approaches to the issue of whether defendants
are entitled to a trial by jury in the United States Court for Berlin. The first is
the due process approach. Due process could focus on either the capability of
the Germans to provide a trial by jury or on the rights of the individual defen-
dant to have a trial by jury. The hearing on socio-cultural factors was used by
the District of Columbia District Court in King v. Andrus.
6
If the United States Court for Berlin relied upon this due process ap-
proach, evidence presented at the hearing would focus on lay participation in
German criminal trials. The Germans have had a long tradition of lay par-
ticipation in civil and criminal trials in the form of "Schoffen, " or lay judges. If
this case were tried in a German court, three professional judges and two Schoff-
en would hear and decide the case. A vote of four would be necessary to convict
so that agreement only by the three professional judges would be insufficient to
convict. A study of lay participation in German trials by Casper and Zeise1
69
includes a comparison of disagreements between Schoffen and professiofial
judges with the disagreements between juries and judges in Kalven and
Zeisel's study of the American jury. Casper, in an affidavit submitted to the
United States Court for Berlin, stated: "Our study clearly indicates that Ger-
man lay judges exercise independent judgment in criminal cases, and do serve
a societal purpose comparable to that of American juries-namely, injecting
the values, experiences, and judgments of the lay community into the adjudica-
tion process.' '70 Nevertheless, the court did not rely on this approach in
deciding whether defendants would be tried by a jury.
65 Record, vol. 2, at 227.
66 Id. at 237.
67 PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE BERLIN
SETTLEMENT 127 (1972).
68 452 F.Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1977). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
69 Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, I J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1972). The Casper-
Zeisel study, conducted over a three-year period, is the only known empirical study of the German lay-judge
system.
70 Defendants' affidavit by Casper on February 23, 1979. Defendants' affidavit states that Gerhard
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Nor did the court rely on the due process approach set forth in Ralpho v.
Bell. 71 There the District of Columbia Circuit had held United States officials
in Micronesia bound by the fifth amendment and Ralpho automatically enti-
tled to its due process protection because of the "any person" language in the
amendment. The issue of trial by jury is, however, more complicated than the
due process required in Ralpho. A due process argument had, of course, been
constructed by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Reid v. Covert. Mrs.
Covert had sought a trial by jury and Mr. Justice Harlan had agreed that she
was so entitled on due process grounds. Once he had asked "what process is
due," Mr. Justice Harlan still had to reach the issue of trial by jury.
A simpler, more direct approach is possible with the issue of trial by jury,
namely, the direct application of the provisions of the Constitution and its
amendments. The Supreme Court expanded the "fundamental rights" re-
quired by the Constitution to obtain in the fifty states of the United States.
During the 1960's, almost all the provisions of the first ten amendments to the
Constitution were held by the Court to be fundamental, incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment and, therefore, applicable in the fifty states, just as the
Bill of Rights must be observed in all actions by the federal government. 72 In
1968, the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana7 3 held that trial by jury is a fun-
damental right in criminal cases. The Court described the safeguards provided
by juries in terms of the empirical study by Kalven and Zeisel, which showed
that juries understand evidence, come to sound conclusions and differ with the
judge "usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for which
they were created and for which they are now employed." ' 74 Duncan, when
combined with the earlier requirement in Reid for trial by jury overseas,, gave
the United States Court for Berlin its first ground for holding Tiede entitled to
trial by jury.
An even stronger ground than Duncan is the pre-Duncan precedent of the
same direct application of the Constitution by the District Court for the District
of Columbia to the occupation courts still operative in the Ryukyuan islands in
the early 1960's. The Ryukyuan precedents are relevant to the United States
Court for Berlin as the successor to the American occupation courts in Ger-
many. The American occupation courts in Germany, in which juries were
legislatively intended to be implemented when feasible, 75 did not continue to sit
after 1955. The American occupation courts in the Ryukyuan islands,
however, remained active after the American peace treaty with Japan was
Casper, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, was born and educated in Hamburg, Germany,
where he studied law at the university and passed the Legal State Examination; in 1964, Casper was also
awarded a doctor of law degree (Dr. iur. utr.) by the University of Freiburg, Germany.
71 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
72 See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
73 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Supreme Court held that "[t]he guarantees ofjury trial in the Federal and
State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government." Id. at 155 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 157 (footnote omitted).
75 E. NOBLEMAN, MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS IN GERMANY 183 n.553 (1955) (Training Packet No.
52 prepared by the Provost Marshal General's School Mil. Gov't Dep't for Organized Reserve Corps
Units) (citing OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY, MILITARY GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BULL.
No. 143 (September 7, 1948)) as the legislative history of the ordinances. At the time Nobleman was
writing, in June, 1950, it was "difficult" to employ juries systematically.
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signed in 1952 until the islands were returned to Japan in 1972.76 Thus, the
developments in the occupation courts in the Ryukyus during the 1960's il-
lustrate what might have happened in Berlin, if the occupation court there had
remained active. The two occupation court systems were similar in many
ways, 7 7 except that the Ryukyuan occupation courts enjoyed a much longer ac-
tive life than the German occupation courts. The Ryukyuan people were
stated 78 to have been more resistant to American ways after 1952 than the Ger-
mans after 1955, since there was then no foreseeable resolution of the
Ryukyuan status vis-a-vis the United States. Nevertheless, the District of Co-
lumbia District Court held that the Constitution required a trial by jury in
criminal cases in this temporary occupation court in the Pacific.
If the occupation court in Berlin had been regularly convened after it was
established in 1955, it is highly likely that during the 1960's a number of cases
similar to the Ryukyuan cases would have arisen and that the legislative intent
expressed at the end of the 1940's to provide for trial by jury would have been
carried out in Berlin. Both "occupations" lasted far longer than usual occupa-
tions in earlier history. The peaceful and protective purposes of these two
American occupations became their most outstanding characteristics.7 9 The
United States Court for Berlin, having been inactive for twenty-four years,
faced in 1979 the situation which arose in the Ryukyus in 1962 and 1963. The
United States Court for Berlin could not go back to 1955, however. The results
in the Ryukyuan and Berlin occupation courts were the same: trial by jury is a
constitutionally guaranteed right in a peace-time occupation court.
C. Application of Tiede to Earlier Cases
The usefulness of the Tiede's official action theory as an analytical tool
becomes apparent when applied in an examination of earlier cases involving
the exercise of United States' military jurisdiction in occupied lands and
United States' participation in international war tribunals. The soundness of
the official action theory is demonstrated as much by the cases which would not
have been decided differently as by the few that might have reached a different
result if the official theory were available then.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized four types of military
jurisdiction. The most familiar type of jurisdiction is military law, personal
jurisdiction applicable by federal statute 80 to members of the armed services.
Military law governs the court-martial of soldiers even during peace-time for
76 By the Nixon-Sato Agreement, June 17, 1971, United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 446, T.I.A.S. No.
7314, the Ryukyus were returned to Japan in May, 1972.
77 In its oral opinion, the Tiede court noted the similarities between the occupation courts in Berlin and
Okinawa. Record, vol. 2, at 241.
78 "A substantial portion of the Ryukyuans are hostile and engage in activities calculated to subvert the
position of the United States." Secretary of Defense's Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent's
Motion for SummaryJudgment at 12, Nicholson v. McNamara, H.C. No. 141-61 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1963).
79 Id. at 928.
80 The federal statute governing courts-martial, originally called the Articles of War (Pub. L. 242, 41
Stat. 807, (1920)) and now the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is to be found at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-938
(1976). See also AYcocK & WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARYJUSTICE (1955);
Mounts & Sugarman, The MilitaryJustie Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969); Wurfel, Court Martial Jurisdic-
tion Under the Uniform Code, 32 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1953); Wurtzel, O'Callahan v. Parker: Where Are We Now;"
56 A.B.A.J. 686 (1970); Symposium, Military Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1971).
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any offenses relating to military life. The second type of military jurisdiction
has occurred only rarely in United States history; military government is a general
territorial jurisdiction over occupied places "superseding, as far as may be
deemed expedient, the local law and exercised by the military commander
under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of
Congress. "81 The predecessor courts to the United States Court for Berlin ex-
ercised such jurisdiction when the United States occupied Germany during and
after World War II. Martial law, the third type of military jurisdiction, is
emergency domestic territorial jurisdiction exercised by the military.8 2 The
newest type of jurisdiction is the special military commission, which may take ac-
tion against any civilian persons accused of violating the law of war, whether
American citizens, aliens or enemies.
8 3
"Military commission" is a generic term. 84 These special military com-
missions do not differ in nature from general military commission courts
established by an occupying military government, except that these special
commissions are short-lived with jurisdiction limited to hearing accusations
against particular persons of violations of the law of war.85 General military
government courts are expected to last somewhat longer and have a broader
jurisdiction. Until after World War II, however, occupation courts did not
have lives extending a generation or longer. Pre-World War II occupation
courts were thus active only in the wake of the hostilities of war; their jurisdic-
tion was soon terminated thereafter. The special commissions and the general
military government courts raise the most relevant constitutional questions for
testing the applicability of the official action theory.
Exparte Quirin85 provides an example of the operation of a special military
81 Ex pare Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 142. it should be noted that the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) charter did not interfere with the rights of the individual governments to try war criminals
in any national or occupation court in Germany or in any allied territory.
82 For a discussion of martial law concepts, see C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943);
Fairman, Martial Rule, in the Light of Sterling v. Constantin, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 20 (1933); Frank, Ex parte
Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1944); Wiener, Martial
Law Today, 49 MIL. L. REV. 89 (1970). In Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), the governor of
Texas declared martial law in the oil fields to prevent oil production. Despite the executive decision, the
Supreme Court reviewed the facts in accordance with the Constitution, holding that "tjhe allowable limits of
military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial ques-
tions." Id. at 401.
83 The first three types of military jurisdiction were described by ChiefJustice Chase in his concurring
opinion in Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 141-42 (1866). The fourth type, operative during and after World
War II, received the recognition of the Supreme Court in Ex pare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Justice Rutledge, in dissent, emphasized in a discussion of the history that
"there is only one kind of military commission." 327 U.S. at 67-72.
84 Military commissions have a long history. Isolated instances of the military commission are found
prior to the establishment of the military government courts that were commissioned during Polk's ad-
ministration to try general crimes as well as offenses against the law of war: 1) in 1776, Captain Nathan
Hale was charged with spying and was tried by a military court; 2) in 1780, MajorJohn Andre' was similar-
ly charged and tried; 3) in the same year, Joshua Kett (in complicity with General Benedict Arnold) was
tried in a special court-martial pursuant to congressional resolution. See Green, The Militaty Commission, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832-833 (1948), citing W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (1920). See also
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828) for military tribunals established (by General Andrew
Jackson at the direction of the President) in Florida, which in 1818 was a territory of Spain. See also VON
GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 106-31 (1957); Colby, Occupation Under the Laws of War, 25
COLUM. L. REV. 904 (1925) and 26 COLUM. L. REv. 146 (1926).
85 The Supreme Court in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S.'341 (1952) called United States occupation
courts "courts in the nature of such [military] commissions." Id. at 346. The military government appoints
the court.
86 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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commission. According to stipulated facts, in June of 1942, eight men wearing
caps or uniforms of the German forces of the Third Reich landed by submarine
at places on the east coast of the United States, buried their uniforms, and
made their way into the interior of the United States. They soon were ap-
prehended by agents of the F.B.I. When arrangements were made to try them
by special military commission, they sought habeas corpus relief.8 7
Petitioners sought constitutional guarantees of trial byjury. 8 The govern-
ment argued that "[c]ourts do not inquire into the Executive's determination
on matters of the type here involved." '8 9 Despite the argument that the
Supreme Court could not review the President's judgment except "in a case of
grave and obvious abuse,''90 the Supreme Court directly reviewed the Presi-
dent's authority to order the trial by military commission and upheld the Presi-
dent's authority so to act. The Court referred to its duty "to preserve unim-
paired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberties''9 1 even in wartime and
specifically addressed the government's "insistence" that petitioners be denied
access to the courts in accordance with presidential proclamation.
It is urged that if they are enemy aliens or if the proclamation has force, no
court may afford the petitioners a hearing.
Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with of-
fenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on
some who are guilty. Ex parte Milligan, supra, 119, 132.92
Noting that the power of all three branches is derived from the Constitution,
the Court not only traced the basis of the President's authority to order the
Commission but also reached the due process issue and found that, even before
the Constitution was adopted, disguised enemy belligerents on American soil,
such as Major John Andre, were tried without a jury.
Would the application of the official action theory of the reach of the Con-
stitution have mandated a trial by jury in Quirin? Tiede requires a two-step
analysis of the facts in Quirin: (1) is the Constitution operative? (2) if so; is
Quirin entitled to a trial by jury? No need to discuss the "reach" of the Con-
stitution arises in Quirin because the enemy defendants had inva ded the United
States itself and the Constitution is automatically operative. Quirin was not
tried in an occupation court but by special commission. The Supreme Court
observed that the power of the executive to conduct the trial had to be derived
from the Constitution. The Supreme Court's emphasis on the enemy-
belligerent status of the defendants and the charge of crimes in violation of the
law of war provide the basis for the second step of the analysis. Recognition of
exceptions for the law of war and the military at the time of the adoption of the
87 For extensive treatment of the history behind Ex parte Quirin, see G. DASCH, EIGHT SPIES AGAINST
AMERICA (1959); E. RACHLIS, THEY CAME To KILL (1961).
88 317 U.S. at 14.
89 Id. at 16.
90 Id. at 17.
91 Id. at 19.
92 Id. at 25.
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Bill of Rights permits the denial of a trial by jury in favor of a military trial in
Quirin's case. Thus, the two-step analysis would not have mandated a trial by
jury in Quirin but it does illustrate the limited pr~cedential value of Quirin to
situations in which the defendant is charged with crimes in violation of the law
of war.
The Supreme Court in In re Yamashita93 upheld the basic principles it set
forth in Quinn when the Japanese Commanding General in the Philippines,
Tomoyuki Yamashita, applied for leave to file various petitions after he sur-
rendered, was tried for violations of the law of war by a military commission of
five army officers, found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. Yamashita ques-
tioned the authority of the commission which tried him after the cessation of
hostilities between the United States and Japan.
The Court held that Congress had not foreclosed the right of enemy aliens
to contend that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authori-
ty to proceed with the trial. It has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of
the government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw
from the courts the duty and power to make such inquiry into the authority of
the commission as may be made by habeas corpus. 94
The Court upheld the appointment of the Commission as a constitutional exer-
cise of the President's authority. 95 Unlike Quirin, however, there was no pres-
ent military necessity or danger in Yamashita, since military hostilities had
ceased, but no review of the due process issue was made by the Court. The dis-
sent in Yamashita discussed at great length the evidentiary and procedural ir-
regularities in Yamashita's trial.96
Here the official action theory might have offered some redress for the
general's claims of denial of due process because it emphasizes the obligations
of United States officials even in the Philippines to act in accordance with the
Constitution. The official action theory protects individual rights as much by
focusing on the official's actions and the integrity of government as it does by
the second step of its analysis. The general's denial that he committed the
crimes of war with which he was charged would not, however, have entitled
him to a trial by jury under the official action theory. Under Quirin, the charge
affects the type of trial available. Retrial by military commission on due pro-
cess grounds may, however, have affected the outcome of Ya nAshita's trial.
93 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
94 Id. at 9.
95 Id. at 12.
96 Grave difficulties with the fairness of the trial in Yamashita appear in the record and form the basis for
the lengthy dissents by Justices Murphy and Rutledge. "I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our
system resides or lurks a power so unrestrained to deal with any human being through any process oftrial."
Id. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Quite apart from the question of the fairness of the trial the dissentingJustices had no dispute with the
majority's assertion of jurisdiction. Justice Rutledge, commenting upon the government's argument that
the trial was protected by military necessity and the authority of the President as Commander in Chief
"subject to no judicial restraint on any account," Id. at 46, recognized the power to punish for crime under
the laws of war or during a subsequent occasion. "The only question is how it shall be done, consistently
with universal constitutional commands or outside their restricting effects. In this sense I think the Constitu-
tion follows the flag." Id. at 46-47. Justice Murphy termed the government's argument that trials of war
criminals are "political matters completely outside the arena ofjudicial review" an "obnoxious doctrine"
and stated that "commonly accepted juridical standards are to be recognized and enforced." Id. at 30.
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In Madsen v. Kinsella,97 the Supreme Court examined the fairness of the
trial procedures used in American occupation courts in Germany and
scrutinized the system under which Madsen was tried. Mrs. Madsen, living on
an air base in the American Zone of occupied Germany in 1949, was charged
under section 211 of the German Criminal Code with murdering her husband,
an Air Force lieutenant, tried by the successor court to the United States
Military Government Court, 98 convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in a
federal prison. In a petition for habeas corpus, Madsen challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the military commission court to try her and argued that she should
have been court-martialed, since Article of War 2(d) applied to her. The
district court discharged the writ and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because of "the importance and novelty of
the jurisdictional issues raised." 99
The Court examined the authority of the President to establish military
commission courts in occupied territory. 10 0 The major issue in the case was the
legality of the court system under which Madsen was tried.'01 The Court took
pains to comment on the "confidence" expressed by the American govern-
ment "in the fairness of those procedures" in the American military govern-
ment courts in Germany.
10 2
The judges who served on the occupation courts were civilians.... Their con-
stitutional authority continued to stem from the President.... In 1948, provi-
sion was made for the appointment of civilian judges with substantial legal ex-
perience. The rights of individuals were safeguarded by a code of criminal
procedure dealing with warrants, summonses, preliminary hearings trials,
evidence, witnesses, findings, sentences, contempt, review of cases and ap-
peals.1
0 3
Thus, the Supreme Court was willing to scrutinize the fairness of the pro-
ceedings in the American military government courts in Germany before
upholding the jurisdiction of these courts. The Court pointed out that there
were no juries, because the exception of the fifth amendment for "cases arising
in the land or naval forces" permitted such cases to be tried without indictment
and trial jury. 10 4 By congressional enactment, Mrs. Madsen was subject to
97 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
98 As ofJanuary 1950, the occupation courts in Germany were called United States Court of the Allied
High Commission for Germany. The President by Executive Order 10062, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965 (1949)
transferred the authority of the United States military government from the armed services reporting to the
Secretary of Defense to the United States High Commissioner for Germany reporting to the Secretary of
State.
99 343 U.S. at 343.
100 Id. at 348.
101 One of the authors of the goverment's brief in Madsen, John Raymond, later wrote a case note in
which he praised the Court's decision for upholding the "civilianized" military government court system.
See Raymond, Madsen v. Kinsella-Landmark and Guidepost in Law of Military Occupation, 47 AM. J. INT'L L.
300, 305 (1953).
102 343 U.S. at 360.
103 Id. at 358-59 (citing the rights of the accused listed in United States Military Government Ordinance
No. 2, Military Government Courts, 12 Fed. Reg. 2191 (1947)).
104 "They did not provide for juries. The presentment or indictment of a grand jury required in a
federal capital case by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, under the terms of that
Amendment, has no application to 'cases arising in the land or naval forces.. . .' The right of trial by jury
required in federal criminal prosecutions by the Sixth Amendment is similarly limited." 343 U.S. at 360
n.26 (citations omitted). The Court did not apply the Insular Cases to the nonavailability of a jury to Mrs.
Madsen in Germany.
[June 1980]
THE REACH OF THE CONSTITUTION
court-martial as an overseas dependent of a serviceman. The validity of oc-
cupation courts was never successfully challenged after Madsen, but the ap-
plicability of Article of War 2(d) to civilians was soon thereafter held un-
constitutional in Reid v. Covert.
Under Tied, Mrs. Madsen herself could not have been tried by a jury in
1949 because of the applicability of the Articles of War to her. After Reid, Mrs.
Madsen again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and her petition was
denied.10 5 Would the result be different under Tiede? Indications are that after
the Uniform Code of Military Justice was held not to subject civilians to court-
martial, Tiede would require a different result in Mrs. Madsen's second peti-
tion. Madsen is not factually identical to Tiede (less the applicability of the Ar-
ticles of War) because the occupation was still in postwar stages when Mrs.
Madsen was charged in 1949. Congress did not declare hostilities with Ger-
many at an end until 1951.
Nevertheless, the legislative history of the occupation reveals an intent
eventually to provide for trial by jury. During the summer of 1948, plans were
made to civilianize the military government and the courts so that the Depart-
ment of State could assume control from the Army.1 0 6 By Ordinance No. 31, a
new military government court system, patterned on the American federal
judicial system,10 7 was established.1 0 8 It consisted of eleven judicial districts
and a Court of Appeals with a Chief Judge and six associate judges. "The
practice now followed conforms in every respect to that in use in American
courts." 10 9
In connection with the concept of establishing a respectable judicial system,
some of the planners of the new system felt that trial by jury should be includ-
ed, and Ordinance No. 31 was so prepared as to allow for its ultimate inclu-
sion." 1 1 0
Under these circumstances, once the occupation became peaceful enough to
contemplate the empaneling of German jurors, it is unlikely that Tiede would
have withheld a trial by jury for civilians not excluded by the Articles of War.
Similarly, Tiede might have made some difference in the United States'
participation in international military tribunals after World War II. The of-
ficial action theory might have required prior clearance under the Constitution
of standards to be applied in the international tribunal before the United States
105 Madsen v. Overholser, 251 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920 (1958).
106 See note 75 supra.
107 See Fairman, supra note 16, at 610.
108 Office of Military Government, United States Zone, in its Ordinances Nos. 31, 32 & 33 (August 18,
1948) created the new system. 14 Fed. Reg. 124-33 (1949).
109 E. NOBLEMAN, supra note 75, at 178. Nobleman noted the similarity between the new military
government court system and the American judicial system after discussing trial practice in the military
government courts under the new ordinances. Particularly, he reviewed the applicability of American rules
of evidence and criminal procedure, such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the defendant's
election to testify during preliminary proceedings or at trial with no inference to be drawn from a
defendant's election not to testify. In addition, the prosecutorial and judicial functions were separated by the
creation of the Office of the Chief Attorney within the Legal Division of the Office of Military Government
United States Zone. Id. at 160. Under Ordinance No. 31, the court system funciioned as a separate unit of
the Office of Military Government completely divorced from the executive division of the Office of Military
Government based on the German States (Lander).
110 Id. at 183.
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could participate. The most famous postwar courts were not the military com-
mission predecessors of the United States Court for Berlin.' Instead, public
attention focused on the international tribunals newly established to try those
accused of major crimes during World War II. The two major international
tribunals were the International Military Tribunal for the prosecution of major
war criminals of the European Axis (IMT) and the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).
The IMT, which sat at Nuremberg from November, 1945, to October,
1946, was created on August 8, 1945, by the London Agreement among the
United States, Great Britain, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to prosecute the major war criminals of the European Axis (the Lon-
don Agreement).1 12 Case No. 1 was the only case tried by the IMT. In one
great trial Goering and other major war criminals were convicted of crimes
against the peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and membership in a
group or organizatiQn declared criminal in the London Agreement.
113
The Charter of the IMT, annexed to the London Agreement, provided for
the establishment of successor tribunals in each zone of occupation to hear ac-
cusations of other major war crimes in Europe. Accordingly, after the IMT
finished its work, a specialized tribunal was established on October 18, 1946, at
Nuremberg in the same courthouse in which the IMT had convened.1 1 4 The
definitions of crimes set forth in the London Agreement were adopted for the
new tribunal.1 15 Habeas corpus relief was sought directly by more than one
hundred of those convicted in this and a similar tribunal at Dachau, also in the
American zone. 116 General Erhard Milch, who was convicted at Nuremberg
and sentenced to life imprisonment for slave labor, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and Dr. Karl Brandt, Hitler's personal physician and Third
Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation, convicted at Nuremberg of
medical experimentation without the subjects' consent, moved directly in the
United States Supreme Court to file petitions for habeas corpus.
In both Milch's and Brandt's cases, Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge
would have granted a hearing on jurisdiction. 1 7 Justice Douglas would have
S11 The ihilitary commission courts were established in Germany by the United States after the end of
World War II in accordance with traditions dating back to Generals Stephen Watts Kearny and Winfield
Scott in the Mexican War. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. 176 (1957); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. 164
(1853). For the activities of these military commission courts, see Clark & Goodman, American Justice in Oc-
cupied Germany: United States Military Government Courts, 36 A.B.A.J. 443 (1950); McCauley, American Courts in
Germany: 600, 000 Cases Later, 40 A.B.A.J. 1041 (1954); Nobleman, Military Government Courts: Law andJustice
in the American Zone of Germany, 33 A.B.A.J. 777 (1947).
112 The text of the London Agreement was published in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 222 (1945).
113 See generally R. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE (1947); Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive
War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396 (1946); Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 455 (1947); Wechsler, The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial, 62 POL. ScL Q. 11 (1947); Rheinstein, Book
Review, 14 U. Cmi. L. REV. 319 (1947).
114 The Office of Military Government, United States Zone, Title 23 Military Government Legislation
403, established the tribunal to succeed the IMT in its Ordinance No. 7, Organization and Powers of Cer-
tain Military Tribunals.
115 See Allied Control Council Law No. 10, of December 20, 1945, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862 (1946)
(adopting the framework of crimes against the peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and membership
in a group of organization declared criminal in the London Agreement).
116 HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 304 (2d ed., 1973). Many of the
cases discussed in this article reached the Supreme Court by petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
117 Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947); a later
petition on behalf of 74 Germans convicted by the military government court at Dachau for crimes con-
nected with the massacre at Malmedy, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge was denied for "want of
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listened to an argument on jurisdiction in Milch's case, but not in Brandt's.
The Court apparently assumed that it takes a majority to set argument on
jurisdiction in such a motion, so that the motions were denied. Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Burton must have believed that
jurisdiction was lacking, although they gave no reason for the denials. Justice
Jackson did not participate because he negotiated the London Agreement on
behalf of the United States.
The second international tribunal, the IMTFE, was set up by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, in
his capacity as agent for the Allied Powers. Former Japanese Premier Koki
Hirota and other Japanese war lords convicted by the tribunal of war crimes
moved in the United States Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. 118 The question of jurisdiction gave rise to the same divisions
among the Justices as had occurred concerning the international tribunal in
Germany. Since Justice Jackson had not been involved in the creation of the
IMTFE, he filed a separate opinion to resolve the impasse. The Court then
held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the conviction, since the IMTFE was
"not a tribunal of the United States. " 11 9
American participation in international tribunals represented a departure
from previous experience.1 2 0 While the United States Supreme Court had no
interest in looking into the conduct of the Allied Powers and no authority12 1 to
review the decision of an international tribunal, Justice Douglas12 2 noted that
the conduct of an American official was subject to review, depending on the
nature of the official's authority:
If an American General holds a prisoner, our process can reach him
wherever he is. To that extent at least, the Constitution follows the flag. It is
no defense for him to say that he acts for the Allied powers. He is an American
citizen who is performing functions for our government. If there is evasion or
violation of its obligations, it is no defense that he acts for another nation.
jurisdiction." Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824, 824 (1948) (per curium). Petitioners made serious allega-
tions that the prosecution was based on the systematic use of improper methods of interrogation. For a com-
prehensive review of the cases considered by the Supreme Court during its 1946, 1947 and 1948 terms, see
Fairman, supra note 16.
118 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Douglas's concurrence was
prepared later in 1949 and appears separately from the opinion); see note 124 infra.
119 338 U.S. at 198.
120 The proposal ofan international criminal court was enthusiastically embraced following the publicity
of the Nuremberg trial. See Ely, The Treaty-Making Power: The Constitutionality of International Courts, 36
A.B.A.J. 738 (1950); Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 644
(1952); Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A.J. 641 (1952).
With regard to stationing troops abroad, some international cooperation came about on the basis of
each cooperating nation's military jurisdiction to try its own accompanying civilians. See Administrative
Agreement with Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, United States-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3342, T.I.A.S. No. 2492; NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846; Convention on the Rights
and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954,
6 U.S.T. 4278, T.I.A.S. No. 3425. See also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Keefe v. Dulles, 222
F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955); Baldwin, Foreign Jurisdiction and the American
Soldier, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 52; "Schuck, Concurrent Jurisdiction Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 57
COLUM. L. REv. 355 (1957); SCHWARTZ, International Law and the NA TO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 COLUM.
L, REV. 1091 (1953); NOTE, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1957).
121 The Justices found difficulty in deriving jurisdiction under article III, 5 2, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion to review alleged violations in international tribunals of defendant's constitutional rights.
122 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948). The Court handed down its decision in Hirota on
December 20, 1948. Justice Douglas took until June 27, 1949, to announce his concurring opinion in
Hirota, perhaps indicating the difficulty of the issues with which he was grappling.
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There is at present no group or confederation to which an official of this Na-
tion owes a higher obligation than he owes to us.'
23
Although the actions of American generals are subject to judicial review under
the Constitution, Justice Douglas held with the majority that other considera-
tions stood in the way of review. If a writ of habeas corpus were granted, the
validity of the judgment rendered by the international tribunal would be in-
directly challenged. The political question doctrine might perhaps, even under
Tiede, prevent consideration of the due process issue, once the United States
had actively participated in the tribunal. While it is much more likely that the
Tiede theory would prevent American participation in an international
tribunal, unless the tribunal agreed to conform to constitutional requirements,
it is also possible that Tiede would have permitted review of the due process
issue in Hirota.
The implications of Tiede for Madsen and Hirota indicate that little case law
would be changed by application of the official action theory of the reach of the
Constitution. Madsen would have had a different result after the Ryukyu cases;
however, the United States is not likely to participate officially in international
war tribunals again without some assurance of conformity to constitutional
principles. 24 Tiede is, however, likely to make a difference in new types of cases
arising more frequently today, in which the focus is on the duty of government
officials to comply with the Constitution abroad as well as at home.
IV. Conclusion
United States v. Tiede is important as the latest analysis of the fundamental
constitutional questions relating to the standards governing the activities of the
United States abroad. The holdings by the United States Court for Berlin that
the Constitution applied and that defendants were entitled to trial by jury are
supported by both the direct application of the Constitution in Reid and by the
due process analysis in Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid. The
Ryukyuan cases made it clear that constitutional rights must be guaranteed
even in American-occupied areas.
Tiede recognizes that constitutional rights cannot be successfully
guaranteed to individuals unless the United States government itself acts in ac-
cordance with the Constitution. Tiede thus ensures individual constitutional
rights by focusing on the standards against which the actions of United States
government officials must be measured. 25 As the presence of the United States
is more frequently felt abroad, it will become increasingly necessary to have
123 Id. at 204.
124 See Ely, supra note 120.
125 On May 29, 1979, the Berliner Morgenpost carried the following editorial on the Court's decision:
"Sic sind cin freier Mann," sagte Stern nach dem Urteil zu Tiede. Mit seiner Unabhangigkeit
und der Unerschrockenheit, mit der er das Verhalten der amerikanischen Anklager kritisierte,
mit seinetn unbestechlichen Gewissen und seiner tiefen Menshlichkeit hat Stern der Welt gazeigt,
was ein wirklich freier Mann ist.
("You are a free man," said Stern after he imposed the sentence. Stern's independence and the
fearlessness with which he criticized the tactics of the American prosecutors, his incorruptible
conscience and his deep humanity have shown to the world what it truly means to be a free man.)
(Translated by B.A. Ristau, Esq.)
[June 1980]
[Vol. 55:6821 THE REACH OF THE CONSTITUTION 707
standards against which to measure the conduct of United States officials
toward American citizens abroad and toward any individual persons or
governmental entities over which United States sovereignty is exercised. Tiede
reminds us that no matter where the United States government is represented,
the standards against which its actions will ultimately be tested are the highest
standards of its own Constitution.
